Introduction
The enactment of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 2006 was a significant legal development in China. It was necessitated by both internal and external political and economic pressures and its impacts were potentially major, not only in addressing these pressures, but also legally and culturally. Hitherto, bankruptcies had been tightly controlled and state-driven alternatives were preferred and the economy was not yet ready to transition to a solely market-driven, rather than state-driven, system of bankruptcies in view of the possible social impact.
1 Nor was the new law sufficient in itself, as a bankruptcy law requires to the new Chinese law will then be briefly considered before a thematic functional analysis of the law in practice will be offered with a view to identifying key factors in the move to market-based, rather than state-directed bankruptcies, while also identifying areas in which progress is still to be made. The operation of the law in the first ten years will be considered with a view to assessing how far the law is operating according to market principles, identifying that there are various factors at play in leading to a low number of cases but that the infrastructure to support market-based cases is being built and there is some evidence to indicate that state influence is transforming to support this. Finally the paper will reflect on possible ways in which the laws might develop in future. individualistic market-based dealings, which lack controls on creditor actions and means for majority voting or cramdowns, are insufficient to resolve the financial distress. In this context, the role of the state is confined to providing a legislative framework and the rule of law to enforce it, an approach which may be termed as "collective market-based". Such an approach will tend to offer advantages through restriction of the entitlements of creditors, since creditors may be restricted from e.g. suing the debtor or repossessing goods, as they would otherwise be able to, 6 and the reaching of a negotiated agreement for the payment of debts is assisted by a requirement of only majority, rather than unanimous, approval for a restructuring plan. 7 Thirdly, there are cases where more direct state action is necessitated, due the socially important nature of the struggling enterprise, and this "state-driven" approach may be helpful in cases where the collective market-based approach is insufficient, for reasons of scale or technicality, for example, or where there is a lack of support or consensus among creditors. The extent to which these approaches can operate without persuasion from the state can be regarded as a measure of the extent to which the insolvency system as a whole is market-based. Looking at these issues more closely, attention in insolvency law literature is often focused on the second approach above of collective market-based proceedings, such as under the US Code, Title 11 and the UK Insolvency Act 1986. It is identified that a competitive market place will naturally lead to the failure of some businesses and the success of others. 8 In theory if the competitive market works perfectly those enterprises which are inefficient will be eliminated from the market, leading to a situation in which the remaining enterprises are those who produce at optimal levels of cost. 9 As part of most developed systems, firms which are facing temporary difficulties may be given protection in a reorganisation procedure through an automatic stay to enable them to resolve their problems without pressure from creditors. 10 Here the state permits some distortion of market forces through restriction, under statutory provisions, of the entitlements of creditors, for example to take action to request 12 An exception arises in the event of economic distress, where the business will raise more value of broken up and its assets sold individually, than it would be if the assets were kept together. entrepreneurship. 30 The slow transformation of China, which is indeed ongoing, inevitably impacted upon efforts to introduce a modern bankruptcy law.
Insolvencies in Market Conditions

Background to the 2006 law
31
One obstacle to the enactment of the 2006 Law was the significant number of uneconomic state-owned enterprises which had become inefficient through a lack of exposure to competitive market forces. 1998 statistics show that, at that time, SOEs provided four fifths of the outputs from the manufacturing sector and employed two thirds of the number of industrial employees. 32 Yet, under the planned economy state owned enterprises were subject to government control, which inevitably led to the operation of the firms for political and social purposes (primarily non-profit seeking), without incentives for economic efficiency, such as budgetary constraints, and without exposure to market forces. In consequence, many were insolvent. The reform process in respect of SOEs was long and complex, involving processes of corporatisation, which improved the corporate governance and performance of SOEs 33 and mergers, which, were used to eliminate some enterprises. Although a trial bankruptcy law had been introduced in 1986 in relation to state owned enterprises it was very far from being operated according to market principles. 36 There was an important loophole for public utility enterprises and enterprises with an important relationship to the economy and livelihoods. 37 The 1986 Law was also a law that provided for heavy state control of insolvency proceedings, in the form of a liquidation group, made up of local government officials and representatives from government agencies, such as concerning taxation. 38 In spite of large numbers of uneconomic state owned enterprises the number of cases brought under the Law was very low 39 and other means of dealing with such enterprises were preferred, so that the approach remained state-driven even after the prospect of a collective market-based approach to insolvencies emerged. market-based economy 44 and it has been subject to a multi-lateral peer review exercise every two years, while receiving praise for economic development there have been criticisms of market interference. The EU, Japan, US and other WTO members have been reluctant to regard China as having a market economy and this has led to tariffs on Chinese exports. The enactment of a modern and market-based bankruptcy law was a step towards the demonstration of a market economy, however it was enacted at a time when China was still at an early stage of its economic transformation and much has happened in the interim.
Nonetheless the US and EU have continued to refuse to recognise China as having a market economy and the tariffs which have been applied by the US to Chinese imports as a result are the subject of a WTO dispute. Empirical Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2018) for an empirical study of reorganisation cases as reported in news sources. One surprising factor has been the rate at which reorganisations can lead to apparent company rescues, as opposed to mere business rescues. However this rescue has tended to be illusory, as companies may be saved only in order to retain the benefit of the company's non-transferrable business license, which a company is issued with upon incorporation and which it requires for trade. In such cases all that is saved is the shell of a listed company, so that its listed status can be retained. This is done by a purchase of the shares of the company and the sale proceeds being used to repay the company's debts as far as possible: Richard composition, 60 alongside the liquidation laws which are a necessary part of any insolvency system but which have played too dominant a role historically. Reorganisation, along the lines of the US Chapter 11 approach, can potentially preserve value by enabling jobs to be saved, while also bringing potential benefits of ongoing business relationships and higher returns to creditors through the negotiation and approval of a plan of reorganisation.
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The new law adopted a greatly reformed system of governance, reflecting a reduced role for the state. In insolvency systems, governance structures 62 tend to involve a blend of controls by insolvency practitioners; the courts; the debtor, under supervision; and creditors. The
Chinese law fits in with this pattern but it is notable that its blend is changing in accordance with the transition to a market-based system. State direction was ostensibly stripped away and a new role of administrator was created to oversee cases upon being appointed by the court. The use of a liquidation group remained possible in some instances, however, in particular to resolve labour related issues and to handle the bankruptcies of SOEs. 12% of reorganisation cases being managed by a wholly private administrator. 65 The role of administrator was a new one requiring the development of new skills and competencies for law and accountancy firms and it offered the prospect of management of insolvency proceedings in an independent manner in the interests of creditors and free from state control.
Other new governance institutions were the creditors' meeting and creditors' committee. The institutions that might be expected under a market-based bankruptcy framework are therefore present but progress is to be made in the development of these institutions in place of state influence.
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Factors in the operation of the law
The environmental factors previously described necessarily limited the initial impact of the law and there were other issues that arose as the courts, creditors, directors and others got used to a new governance system, leading to low numbers of cases. composition. 68 This was not to say, however, that there were no failures. Rather there were significant numbers of companies leaving the market without going through the formal, collective bankruptcy procedure, about 7-800,000 each year. If we take bankruptcy as the mandated process for ending the affairs of an insolvent company, in accordance with creditor priorities established under statute, we can see here a deviation from market expectations.
The numbers of formal insolvency proceedings may be regarded as low, considering that there are an estimated 77 million businesses in China. 69 A variety of factors has contributed to this shortfall, and while state influence in part will have impacted on some cases, as discussed below, there are indications that this influence is declining and that market influence is playing a greater role but that progress must still be made in addressing weaknesses that have limited the capacity of institutions to handle the insolvencies which have emerged. 
Disincentives for Filing
The conditions for opening proceedings are now, on paper at least, in the hands of debtors and creditors, free of state influence. Article 2, which contains the conditions for opening proceedings, has no loophole enabling a company to be protected where it is a public utility enterprise or an enterprise with an important relationship to the economy and livelihoods, as under the 1986 Law, and it might therefore be expected that the market would influence the supervisory functions 86 and the court is required to give approval of the creditors' committee membership. 87 The appointment, replacement or approval of resignation of the administrator is also handled by the court. 88 The courts also are required to approve the conversion of reorganisation proceedings to debtor in possession proceedings. 89 The courts are required to give approval to reorganisation plans 90 liquidation. The courts also have cramdown powers along similar lines to the United States model. 92 As might be expected, the court also decides if proceedings are to be terminated.
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The heavy involvement of courts in cases, combined with the limited number of previous bankruptcy cases and relative concentration of those cases in particular geographical areas meant that many courts were unfamiliar with bankruptcy cases and placed limitations on the acceptances of cases, so that numbers of cases remained low. The courts already had significant workloads and the acceptance of a bankruptcy case would have entailed judges having to gain familiarity with a new and technical branch of law, which also comes with a significant associated workload, 94 in the absence of detailed guidance. There was therefore a reluctance of local courts to accept bankruptcy cases, which are complex and time consuming.
Given these pressures and practical limitations some courts issued restrictions on the cases that they would accept, suspending applications or accepting only those with state support. result, many distressed debtors are sued even though they lack the capability to pay, 99 while the debt enforcement processes rarely lead to a fair distribution of the debtor's assets.
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Situations of financial distress preferably require a collective response, however, and efforts are now being made in some areas to filter such cases towards the bankruptcy processes. 
Administrator System
The effectiveness of the bankruptcy system will depend not only on the establishment of specialist courts and creativity in relation to processes, it will also require the development of experienced and expert administrators to replace the state-centred liquidation groups as the controllers of insolvency proceedings. The office of administrator is an important role in the insolvency process, 104 and can be regarded as one of the key features of a collective, marketbased system. 105 The office of administrator therefore is highly important if state influence is to be reduced, however this office has yet to reach its full potential.
There are several suggestions in the Summary for the improvement of the administrators' system. Firstly, the types of persons and firms permitted to act as administrators should be broadened and the potential sources of administrators in individual cases expanded. For example, the idea is entertained that turnaround in specialist areas can more effectively be achieved by industry specialists. Even if such persons do not possess expertise in relation to all aspects of the work of administrators they could be appointed as advisers in particular cases. In addition, the geographical limitation of the list could potentially be removed. Firm) for any particular performance. Further, as the administrator had provided evidence of its performance, it was difficult for Wang Junjie to prove that the administrator had failed to meet the due diligence requirement. To improve levels of creditor protection, it may be helpful to have an association work both as a regulator and facilitator of such cases. Thirdly, even where the administrator has been appointed by the court, it is arguable that the appointing process should fully introduce a competitive mechanism, and effectively select the administrator from a wider range of candidates to improve the quality of bankruptcy management. Further, a bankruptcy administrator's salary guarantee system is suggested to solve the problem of insufficient remuneration of administrators in bankruptcy cases, which may act as a disincentive for skilled individuals to pursue this line of work.
Remaining State Influence
Although the control of the state has ostensibly been stripped away in favour of administrator control and the removal of the power to block the opening of proceedings it is notable that state influence can still be exerted at various levels. 110 This is most evidently so in cases where the liquidation group has been preserved but it has also been evident in the pervasive 109 In remaining cases where the government is involved in an insolvency the Summary identified that it would be of benefit to a "bankruptcy unified coordination mechanism" in which the government and the courts can work together smoothly. The government is expected to support the courts with tax incentives, credit repair, and facilitating the resettlement and protection of employees in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy cases that may trigger financial risks and affect social stability will be evaluated according to law, plans will be formulated, and progress will be made steadily. Particular care may need to be taken in relation to enterprises that have mutual guarantees, serial guarantees, 128 private financing or illegal fund-raising relationships, as, without effective measures, there could be a triggering of regional risks and mass incidents.
There has been a development of special approaches for the protection of high-quality by shocks such as the Sino-US trade wars. These measures aim to preserve value by enabling a business to maintain its high quality overall production management system and capabilities, rather than using a value-destroying auction break-up sale approach to clear the company's liabilities, leading to the destruction of its overall production management system and capabilities.
An approach to development of turnaround expertise can be illustrated by the bankruptcy reorganisation of Chongqing Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. This company entered reorganisation proceedings in July 2017 when a liquidation group was appointed. The successful bankruptcy reform of this company came about because of the introduction of the "Four Sources Fund".
The "Four Sources Fund" is essentially a rescue enterprise established for the restructuring of the steel industry and with mastery of the different production factors of steel production, including capital, the steel industry market, steel industry management, steel industry technology and other production factors. These new production factors were used to improve the processes and procedures of Chongqing Iron and Steel Co., Ltd and a turnaround was consequently achieved in the short months after the reorganisation. 129 In October 2018 the company announced a net profit of 1.48 billion yuan had been achieved in the 9 months from January to September, compared with a net loss of 882.08 million yuan a year earlier. The numbers of bankruptcy cases are likely to continue to grow. One factor is that it has become easier to establish companies in China following an easing of the capital requirements. 133 Given the high failure rates of startups, we might expect the numbers of private company bankruptcies to increase and the building of the infrastructure to support these cases must continue apace. There is also likely to be a growth in personal insolvencies, both through increased consumer debt and also through calling-in of guarantees given by owners of failed businesses, and cross-border insolvencies 134 and it is desirable that the law and legal system should develop to support these cases.
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Conclusion
The PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 remains a remarkable achievement but the enactment of formal rules with features of a market-based system was never going to be sufficient in itself to bring about a transformation to a market-based system in practice. This remain in cases where there is a prospect of social instability however such influence is found also in other jurisdictions in cases where an insolvency would have significant negative externalities and it is arguably not inconsistent with the existence of a market-based approach.
